
Alarm management

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Why ?

- **Most control centers have between 100 and 200 standing alarms.**
- **During upsets, some alarms were not noticed.**
- **General feeling : “our alarm system isn’t right”**

Content

- Alarm philosophy
- Bad actors treatment
- Advanced techniques
- Systematic approach
- Results
- Conclusion

Alarm philosophy

- **“Principles for implementation and management of control system alarms”**
- **Alarm = Signal that console operator is required to intervene in process operation to correct a condition in the unit. Expected time available for response and likely consequences of not responding will determine alarm priority.**
- **Alert = Operator guide, no intervention required. Watch out for wrong use.**

Alarm philosophy (cont.)

■ Objectives :

- Notify operators of events required more focused attention
- Help to prioritize response, minimize escalation
- Guide operator towards most appropriate response

Alarm priority determination

- Evaluation of each configured alarm (can be more than one per tag)
 - What happens when the operator does not react ?
 - Take into account other subsequent alarms

Alarm priority determination

	Low impact	Moderate impact	High impact
Personal safety	light injury 40	disability 50	severe or death 60
Environmental	fallout w/o Shut Down 30	fall out with Shut Down 40	major/regulatory 50
Production	10 – 100 K\$ 20	100 K\$ – 1 M\$ 30	> 1 M\$ 40
Mechanical	< 10 K\$ 10	10 – 100 K\$ 20	> 100 K\$ 30

Alarm Priority	Weight	operator response time (min.)
LOW	40 - 80	60
HIGH	80 - 100	15
EMERGENCY	> 100	5

Training

- All operators need to be trained on alarm philosophy
- All changes to be communicated to operators :
 - eg : via loss control meetings or daily instructions

How to start ?

- **Pragmatic approach : look for “quick wins”**
 - Bad actors treatment
 - Advanced techniques

- **Systematic approach :**
 - Huge effort : not possible in start of project.
 - When project has enough momentum : start it

- **Honeywell HiSpec was involved in first phase.**

AMO suite

- Tool which collects configuration data and “journals” of TPS (TDC3000) system
- Data stored in MS Access Database
- Queries : frequency, chattering alarms, standing alarms, duplicate alarms, etc.

Bad actors treatment

■ Bad actors discussions

- AMO suite lists were used to identify bad actors :
 - Frequency of alarms : mainly this list used
 - Time in alarm
 - Chattering alarms
 - Standing alarms
 - Duplicate alarms

Discussion methodology

■ A checklist is used :

- tagname, descriptor, alarmed parameter
- alarm initiating event, consequences, operator action
- hazop documentation
- alarm nuisance characteristic, alarm point setting, alarm deadband, ...
- recommendations : delete, create, modify, housekeeping,...

Bad actors treatment : example

■ Center x:

- +/- 400 alarms discussed (1 week session)
- resulted in :
 - workorders : 52
 - actions for Process Control Department :
 - modifications of point configuration : 143
 - masking and grouping : 87
 - actions for OSA : 3
 - structural problems 9

Advanced techniques

■ Possible advanced techniques :

- Alarm masking
- Alarm grouping
- Use of “overviews” instead of alarms : e.g. OSA, MOV’s, dedicated screens for upsets, ...
- Configuration of “systems” : e.g. furnaces, reactors, different operating scenario’s, drums, pumps (ampèrage, local/remote, min. flow), sets of controllers on same measurement, controller cascades, ...

Applied advanced techniques

■ Alarm Masking

- Interesting on pumps and compressors
- Indication on the graphic for the operator
- Link to a logic information graphic

■ Alarm Grouping

- Interesting for skids, reactors, furnaces and during shutdowns
- Indication on the graphic & link to a logic information graphic with bypass possibility

■ Documentation for each implementation is directly accessible in Lotus Notes

Applied advanced techniques

Why only these techniques ?

- Masking and grouping have direct impact on frequency and on alarm floods in upsets. So this compensates shortcomings of bad actors treatment (works mainly on frequency)
- Limited manpower resources available

Systematic approach

■ First applied on ethylene plant :

- all alarms of a “subsystem” discussed :
various scenarios were discussed, to identify which alarms were needed, determine priority, setting, etc.
- exercise led by daycontroller
- executed on all furnaces and C2 splitter

Results : examples

■ Furnace

	emergency	high	low	total
before	9	184	133	326
after	4	25	71	100

■ C2 splitter

	emergency	high	low	total
before	34	93	116	243
after	24	67	32	123

Status : active alarms (in normal operation)

	center x	center y	center z
before	300	250	250
after bad actors treatment	200	130	170
after appl. adv techniques and/or system. approach	80	30	20
"real alarms"	30	15	10
instrument problems	50	15	10

■ Remarks :

- In normal operation, less than 20 “real” alarms is achievable
- Instrument problems are the major hurdle to achieve this

Status alarm frequency (monthly) : center

	before	after
frequency for operator (alarm summary)	19000	14000
total frequency	27000	15000
% of total freq. caused by instr. problems	40%	25%
number of disabled alarms	50	15


■ Remarks :

- total frequency is frequency when no disabling would be used
- most alarms which require instrument repair are disabled

Status : Alarm configuration

Total reduction : 20 % !

Center x



Operator alert

- Operator tool, NO alarm system
- Operator can set alert limits on any PV or OP
- Max 100 alerts per center
- Possible applications :
 - filling of vessels
 - warming up of furnaces, reactors
 - etc.
- Implementation details under discussion with operators
- User alert tool of Honeywell under evaluation.

Conclusions

- **Significant mentality change made : everybody is cooperating**
- **Major progress has been made, but ...**
- **Still a long way to go !**